America's Strategic Posture
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Strategic Posture Commission Report
The Stakes
Today, the U.S.-led international order is under threat from the Chinese and Russian authoritarian regimes, which seek to disrupt and displace this order and create a new version conducive to their authoritarian regimes, premised on values antithetical to those held by the United States and like-minded Allies and partners worldwide.
A central thrust of China’s and Russia’s adversarial approach toward the United States is their building of military capabilities, including major expansion and modernization of nuclear capabilities, which could lead to a situation where both powers pose an existential threat to the United States.
Unless the United States adjusts its strategic posture, U.S. vital interests and international stability are at risk during the 2027-2035 period.
There is a growing risk of confrontation with China, Russia, or both. This includes the risk of military conflict.
The very real prospect of regional aggression by nuclear-armed adversaries against the United States and its Allies and partners now threatens U.S. vital interests and strategic stability. Directed from top leadership in both nations, China and Russia are pursuing advantage across a range of fronts. Russia remains a nuclear peer. China is advancing toward peer status across the full range of military capabilities, including modern nuclear weapons. The aggressive policies of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are increasing the risk of military confrontation or conflict with China, Russia, or possibly both.
U.S. Allies and partners give the United States a clear strategic advantage. If the United States were to adopt a defense strategy and associated strategic posture no longer based on existing alliance systems in Asia and Europe, U.S. vital interests would be at risk, U.S. global influence diminished, and Americans’ liberties threatened.
While it requires significant investment to maintain a strategic posture sufficient to prevent war with a major power, it will be far more expensive, in lives and resources, to fight such a war. Losing such a war would have existential consequences.
Threat Implications
- Due to China’s nuclear build-up, the United States will no longer be able to treat the Chinese nuclear threat as a “lesser included case” of the Russian nuclear threat.
- China’s rapid expansion of its nuclear forces and Russia’s increasing reliance on nuclear weapons and potentially expanded nuclear arsenal are an unprecedented and growing threat to U.S. national security and potentially the U.S. homeland.
- The U.S. theater nuclear force posture should be urgently modified to...Compensate for any shortfall in U.S. and allied non-nuclear capabilities in a sequential or simultaneous two-theater conflict against Russia and China.
- The new partnership between Russian and Chinese leaders poses [means]…the United States and its Allies and partners must…effectively deter and defeat simultaneous…aggression in Asia and Europe using conventional forces.
- In short, shifting to a necessary two-war construct requires increases in the size, type, and posture of U.S. and allied conventional forces.
- Existing U.S. and allied general purpose forces’ long-range non-nuclear precision strike capabilities are inadequate.
- Current plans to modernize and expand the nation’s global mobility capabilities, especially its fleet of air refueling tankers, are inadequate for a simultaneous two-war construct.
- Russia continues to expand and modernize those nuclear capabilities, with potentially destabilizing effects. In addition, Russia is expanding and modernizing its large and diverse set of nonstrategic nuclear systems, which are capable of delivering nuclear or conventional warheads.
- Due to China’s nuclear build-up, the United States will no longer be able to treat the Chinese nuclear threat as a “lesser included case” of the Russian nuclear threat. China’s capacity for rapid change, and opacity concerning its intentions, presents great challenges.
- Russia is projected to continue to expand and enhance its nuclear forces, with most of the growth concentrated in theater nuclear forces, thus increasing its decided numerical advantage over U.S. and allied nuclear forces.
- China appears to have decided to change the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy (e.g., adopting an expanded theater nuclear war-fighting role), in anticipation of a conflict over Taiwan and perhaps in pursuit of its broader national objectives.
- Space, cyber, and other non-kinetic capabilities are not adequately reflected in a coherent U.S. strategy.
- Effective cyber defense requires a whole-of-government approach, as the Department of Defense has neither the mission nor the necessary authorities to defend civilian critical infrastructure.
- The Commission concludes that China continues to engage in biological and chemical activities with dual-use applications, The Commission is concerned that new developments in genetically engineered and novel biological agents pose a significant threat to U.S. and allied security, and the Commission assesses that the BWC will not effectively prevent the development and deployment of new biological weapons.
- Unlike previous conflicts in the 20th century, a future potential conflict with China or Russia would likely involve new kinetic and non-kinetic attacks on the U.S. homeland and assets in space and cyber domains.
- The United States will face escalating challenges to defending the homeland given the evolution of adversarial capabilities that can impact the nation and its people.
- China’s and Russia’s strike systems will give them capabilities that will allow them to successfully threaten the U.S. homeland below the nuclear threshold. Such aperception on their part, unless directly addressed, raises the risk of deterrence failure.
- Advances in critical technologies such as autonomous technology, hypersonic weapons, AI, quantum computing, and biotechnology offer China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea an expanding range of strategic capabilities that emanate from all domains.
- China is steadily progressing toward its goal of becoming a world-class leader in space with the intent to match or surpass the United States by 2045. China has counterspace-weapon capabilities intended to target U.S. and allied satellites. The PLA will continue to acquire and develop a range of counterspace capabilities, including kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers/directed-energy weapons, orbiting space robots, and ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles.
- Russia views U.S. space-based capabilities as a soft underbelly that Russia is seeking to exploit, and in 2022, Russia warned at the United Nations that commercial infrastructure in outer space used for military purposes “can become a legitimate target for retaliation.
- Russia is currently developing an arsenal of space and counterspace capabilities to challenge U.S. space dominance. These efforts include fielding new antisatellite weapons to disrupt and degrade U.S. and allied space capabilities; developing, testing, and fielding an array of nondestructive and destructive counterspace weapons for targeting U.S. and allied satellites and fielding capabilities to limit U.S. access to space during crisis and conflict.
- U.S. defense strategy to address the two-nuclear-peer threat requires a U.S. nuclear force that is either larger in size, different in composition, or both; therefore, decisions must be made now to meet evolving deterrence requirements.
- The current multi-program, multi-decade U.S. nuclear modernization program is necessary, but not sufficient to enable the nuclear strategy recommended by the Commission to address an unprecedented two-nuclear-peer threat environment.
- Additional U.S. theater nuclear capabilities will be necessary in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific regions to deter adversary nuclear use and offset local conventional superiority.
- The Commission believes that due to previous years of neglect and a dangerous threat environment, the infrastructure (facilities and workforce) that enables development and fielding of strategic capabilities needs to be overhauled. This will require nothing short of a government-wide focus akin to the U.S. moonshot of the 1960s.
- The Commission recommends Congress fund an overhaul and expansion of the capacity of the U.S. nuclear weapons defense industrial base and the DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise, including weapons science, design, and production infrastructure.
- The Commission recommends a number of specific actions to expand the capacity and effectiveness of the nation’s infrastructure and supply chain for its strategic capabilities.
- Funding needs to be prioritized and long-range non-nuclear precision strike programs must be accelerated to meet the operational need and in greater quantities than currently planned.
- Conventional capabilities must be fully integrated with U.S. nuclear capabilities to be properly prepared for the potential of deterrence failure.
- Deter limited strategic attacks, including limited nuclear escalation, through a flexible response strategy enabled by U.S. and allied nuclear and conventional forces.
- The U.S. should urgently deploy a more resilient space architecture.
- Survivability and endurability of essential U.S. and allied space capabilities must be ensured through active defense, passive defense, and U.S. terrestrial strike and offensive counterspace capabilities.
- Essential U.S. space capabilities constitute critical infrastructure that merits an explicit threat of response to enhance deterrence of adversary strategic attack.
- President direct a whole-of-government approach to financial and economic statecraft that analyzes what adversaries value in the economic and financial domain.
- The Commission supports the work of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution Commission to reform budget processes and identify alternate pathways to effectively and more rapidly leverage commercial innovation for defense. Beyond military applications, the incorporation of some of these technologies across the diplomatic, informational, and economic tools also carry potential strategic benefits.
- An important national goal is avoiding strategic surprise. The Commission is concerned that emerging technologies could result in military capabilities that would rapidly and surprisingly shift the military balance between the United States and its Allies and potential adversaries.
- Arms control agreements in the U.S. national interest are potentially important tools to support U.S. policy goals, but given Russia’s history of noncompliance and illegal treaty suspensions, and China’s continued intransigence on arms control dialogue, the United States cannot develop its strategic posture based on the assumption that arms control agreements are imminent or will always be in force. In short, the United States must be prepared for a future with and without arms control agreements.
- The United States cannot set its arms control limits without first determining the requirements for its overall strategic posture, and the strategy that those requirements will support.
- Certain weapon technologies deserve urgent attention, as incipient threats and potential subjects for future arms control negotiations. An example is China’s development of ICBM-launched FOBS or MOBS.
Executive Summary
We will face a world where two nations possess nuclear arsenals on par with our own. The risk of conflict with these two nuclear peers is increasing.
It is an existential challenge for which the United States is ill-prepared.
Decisions need to be made now in order for the nation to be prepared to address the threats from these two nuclear-armed adversaries… simultaneously.
Whole-of-Government Approach
The U.S. must develop and effectively implement a truly integrated, whole-of-government strategy to address the 2027-2035 threat environment.
Two-War Construct
The objectives of U.S. strategy must include effective deterrence and defeat of simultaneous Russian and Chinese aggression in Europe and Asia using conventional forces.
The size and composition of the nuclear force must account for the possibility of combined aggression from Russia and China. U.S. strategy should no longer treat China’s nuclear forces as a “lesser included” threat. The United States needs a nuclear posture capable of simultaneously deterring both countries.
US strategy should no longer treat China’s nuclear forces as a “lesser included” threat. The United States needs a nuclear posture capable of simultaneously deterring both countries.
Nuclear Strategy based on six fundamental tenets: assured second strike, flexible response, tailored deterrence, extended deterrence and assurance, calculated ambiguity in declaratory policy, hedge against risk.
Modernizing to Meet POR
The Commission recommends fully and urgently executing the U.S. nuclear modernization Program of Record (POR), which includes replacement of all U.S. nuclear delivery systems, modernization of their warheads, comprehensive modernization of U.S. nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3), and recapitalizing the nuclear enterprise infrastructure at the DOD and DOE/NNSA.
Necessary but Not Sufficient
The current U.S. strategic posture will be insufficient to achieve the objectives of U.S. defense strategy in the future due to the rapid advancement of the threat, particularly the nuclear threat of two peer adversaries. Urgent, significant change is required in the U.S. overall strategic posture, particularly with respect to U.S. nuclear posture.
Theater Nuclear Capabilities
Additional U.S. theater nuclear capabilities will be necessary in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific regions to deter adversary nuclear use and offset local conventional superiority.
Infrastructure Overhaul and Expansion
Due to previous years of neglect and a dangerous threat environment, the infrastructure (facilities and workforce) that enables development and fielding of strategic capabilities needs to be overhauled and expanded. This will require nothing short of a government-wide focus akin to the U.S. moonshot of the 1960s.
The infrastructure modernization POR is necessary but not sufficient to meet the future threat. When the DOE/NNSA production infrastructure modernization was planned it was sized to support the stockpile the United States believed it needed in 2010 to support a New START size force. As a result, the planned DOE/NNSA production infrastructure will not have sufficient capacity to support the force needed to address the future threat.
Infrastructure
Within the DOD, weapons platforms, support components, and the underlying infrastructure to sustain weapons systems in the U.S.
Another challenge to the DOD weapon system support infrastructure is having the appropriate resources and facilities to sustain legacy platforms while simultaneously producing a modernized weapon system.
Manufacturing and Supply Chain
Diminishing manufacturing sources, lack of skilled trades in the workforce, and supply chain fragility, among other things, inhibit both sustainment and modernization of the strategic deterrent force (platforms and warheads).
Congress should forge and sustain bipartisan consensus and year-to-year funding stability to enable the defense industry to respond to innovative DOD contracting approaches and invest with more certainty.
Work Force
Recruiting, training, and retaining the workforce needed to both sustain the current nuclear forceand transition to modern weapon systems is a growing challenge.
Two Theater Conflict
Though increasing the size, type, and posture of U.S. and allied conventional forces in two different theaters is costly and complex, it is fundamental to preventing regional conflict that may escalate to nuclear use.
A “coercive” attack consists of limited conventional or nuclear strikes intended to convince U.S.leadership that the costs of intervening or persevering in a conflict involving the attacker are too high. If an adversary perceives that the United States would not or could not continue to fight after executing such a strike, that strike is incentivized. Such coercive attacks are bounded in scale to avoid eliciting a severe U.S. response.
Conflict in New Domains
China and Russia consider [our] dependency [on space to be] a soft underbelly and seek to exploitit. They intend to limit our access to space during crisis and conflict, and they are fieldingcapabilities to that effect.
U.S. adversaries were actively using “cyber-enabled campaigns to erode U.S. military advantages,threaten our infrastructure, and reduce our economic prosperity.
Conventional/Nuclear Integration
If [we] do not field sufficient conventional forces…U.S. strategy would need to…increase reliance on nuclear weapons to deter or counter opportunistic or collaborative aggression in the other theater.
Allied Relationships Strengthen American Security
Allies and partners are important as together we are stronger. Greater cooperation, coordination and integration with our Allies and partners is essential to deter conflict and prosper economically.
These relationships strengthen American security by deterring aggression regionally, before it can reach the U.S. homeland, while also enabling U.S. economic prosperity through access to international markets.
The Executive branch should recognize that any major change to U.S. strategic posture, policies, or capabilities will have great effect on Allies’ perceptions and their deterrence and assurance requirements. As a result, any changes should be predicated on meaningful consultations.
It is of paramount importance for the United States to work to reduce strategic risks. This involves activities and programs across the U.S. government, including in nonproliferation and arms control, as well as maintaining strong, viable, and resilient military forces.
Arms Control
A strategy to address the two-nuclear-peer threat environment be a prerequisite for developing U.S.nuclear arms control limits for the 2027-2035 timeframe. Once a strategy and its related force requirements are established, the U.S. government determine whether and how nuclear arms control limits continue to enhance U.S. security.
The United States must be prepared for a future with and without arms control agreements.
Non-Proliferation
U.S. nonproliferation efforts and the nonproliferation regime have slowed the spread of nuclear weapons, thereby making the world safer. It is in the U.S. interest to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states.
Strategic Drivers
Recommendations
Findings
Amplifying Information
Hard Questions
